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Chapter 2
Mergers and Alliances in France: Incentives,
Success Factors and Obstacles
Andre´e Sursock
2.1 Introduction
The number of mergers and alliances in higher education has grown recently in
Europe, and France has not escaped this general trend. An unpublished survey of
the 34 national associations of universities that are members of the European
University Association (EUA) shows that, as of November 2012, 21 associations
reported activities in this area. The survey revealed that motivations for such
activities could be grouped into four categories (several of which may be relevant
to a single country): economies of scale; enhanced regional or international impact;
increased quality via the rationalisation of the education offer and the consolidation
of a fragmented research sector; and creating new synergies in education and
research by seizing on the opportunity of a demographic decline. Although these
might be shared objectives, they should not conceal important contextual differ-
ences. Thus, this chapter presents the evolving French policy context that has led to
recent mergers and alliances in universities. The stand-alone schools of engineering
or of commerce are also engaged in a similar process but these types of institutions
are not part of this historical account because their motives and trajectory for
engaging in such activities are somewhat different from those of the universities.
The chapter is based on several empirical sources: the author’s direct involve-
ment in the evaluations of four French alliances (two regional alliances, an institu-
tional merger and an international consortium involving French universities), in the
international visiting board of a Parisian university, and in the 2012 review of
French higher education and research that was initiated by the government
following Franc¸ois Hollande’s election in 2012. The chapter is also based on formal
and informal discussions held with French university leaders over the course of
nearly 20 years, as well as a number of printed sources.
A. Sursock (*)
European University Association, Brussels, Belgium
e-mail: andree.sursock@eua.be
© The Author(s) 2015
A. Curaj et al. (eds.), Mergers and Alliances in Higher Education,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-13135-1_2
17
This chapter shows that alliances and mergers have been promoted by
institutional leaders as a step toward rationalising French higher education and
research, consolidating its various elements, and improving its impact interna-
tionally. It is the result of at least 50 years of policy development. However, if
these steps were perceived as logical and important by decision makers and many
university presidents, they were not perceived as such by some of the rank-and-file
academics, particularly when these policies were viewed through the prism of
partisan politics and ideology. The new government of Franc¸ois Hollande decided
to examine the impact of past legislative reforms and consider new legislative
changes. These are currently under discussion. To use Christine Musselin’s apt
words, this is indeed “the long march of the French universities” (Musselin 2001).
The interested reader is warned that the legal saga is not finished; its next episodes
will have to be found elsewhere than in this chapter.
2.2 The Foundations of the French Higher
Education System
French higher education and research policies of the past decades have been aimed
at addressing two perceived weaknesses of the system – hyper-centralisation and
hyper-fragmentation. In the interest of brevity, it could be said that the seeds of
these two weaknesses were sown in the eighteenth century.
2.2.1 Fragmentation
Around the French Revolution, the state created the first “grandes e´coles” through
the establishment of the Ecole normale supe´rieure and the Ecole polytechnique.
These institutions followed in the footpath of older tertiary (non-university)
institutions that were dedicated to the training of engineers, including of military
personnel. Access to the “grandes e´coles” has been through a concours (a highly
selective competition), a feature that is explained as being fundamental to
reinforcing democracy because it ensures that social mobility is based on merit
rather than birth. In other words, the process of elite formation through a concours
has been viewed as fair and democratic because – theoretically – everyone holds the
same chances to success. Although Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) showed the
extent to which the system reproduced elites, the ideological commitment to this
approach has not wavered.
The fragmentation of institutions of higher learning produced a model that is
unique in the world in that small, specialised, elite schools (the grandes e´coles) are
at the apex of a pyramid whose base is constituted by large, multidisciplinary
universities that are required to accept any holder of a baccalaure´at, without any
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selection or even academic orientation. This means, for instance, that the holders of
professional and technological baccalaure´ats have access to the universities even
though these baccalaure´ats were meant to lead into vocational higher education.
This situation results in relatively high failure rate in the first year of university and
a sense, on the part of the universities, that they are given worthy social mobility
and democratic objectives but without the financial means to succeed. Indeed, the
universities receive less funding per student than the grandes e´coles.
The fragmentation of the higher education landscape was further aggravated by a
policy of reinforcing research outside the universities. This was embodied by the
most visible of all research organisations, the prestigious Centre national de la
recherche scientifique (CNRS). (To note, there are several other such organisms but
the acronym CNRS is used in this chapter as shorthand for all of them.).
2.2.2 Centralisation
The Emperor Napole´on I created the imperial university, managed centrally by the
ministry. In the process of creating one university (with a multitude of branch
faculties across France), the imperial power, in effect, destroyed the French uni-
versities qua institutions. There were institutions that continued to be called
universities but these were empty shells and the government dealt with the branch
faculties directly. This reality was reflected in the most common way that the
general public spoke of universities, referring to them as “fac” for faculties.
The institutions had no autonomy in relation to their “autorite´ de tutelle” – a very
strong expression referring to their ministry and suggesting the extent to which the
ministry ran the universities’ affairs.
Managed centrally meant that – at least, in principle – all universities had the
same mission, and the same profile as prescribed by law. In fact, the legal frame-
work was so detailed that, over the years, the universities came to teach study
programmes whose components were defined centrally. They had little leeway to
innovate, particularly for the first years of the initial cycle. This has changed
relatively recently but the temptation of central regulation is still very strong.
2.3 From the 1960s to the 1990s
Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, three important processes emerged
within the higher education system, which were somewhat at odds with one
another.
• Firstly, a rapprochement between the universities and the research organisations
started with the creation of “associated laboratories” (university laboratories
co-funded by the CNRS) and later, the unite´s mixtes de recherche (UMR), or
joint research units: these brought researchers from the universities and the
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CNRS or equivalent organisations into the same laboratories. The universities,
however, felt that the CNRS was strengthening its own research capacity by
picking the best brains in the universities.
• Secondly, autonomous faculties were regrouped by the government into one or
more universities in some cities. Thus, three universities replaced the Universite´
de Grenoble; three, the Universite´ de Strasbourg; four, the Universite´ de Bor-
deaux; etc. To take the example of Nancy, newly formed Nancy 1 became
specialised in sciences and medicine, Nancy 2, in social sciences and the
humanities and the Institut national polytechnique de Lorraine regrouped several
engineering schools. To a certain extent, the new universities represented an
attempt to promote a level of interdisciplinarity but within a rather small range
of disciplines. It was only in the smaller – to medium-size towns that truly
interdisciplinary, comprehensive universities (with or without medicine) were
found. In addition, a history of autonomous faculties cannot be erased easily and
lingering, nostalgic feelings contributed to centrifugal tensions within the newly
created universities (Finance 2012).
• Thirdly, France recognised that the legal framework should support the new
universities by providing more autonomy and strengthening their leadership.
Perhaps this was a rational political response to the massification of higher
education and the realisation that the sector had become too big to be managed
centrally. In an attempt to strengthen both the universities and their leadership,
the institutions were asked to develop and negotiate a strategic project with the
ministry that was enshrined in a multi-year contract. The contract strengthened
the central leadership of universities and required the university presidents
and the top leadership teams to shape and coordinate an institutional strategy.
The universities were assigned an advisor (a former university president) who
served as coach and mentor to the presidential team and advised during the
process of developing and negotiating the contracts. The ministry, however, paid
these advisors; as such, they had to balance the interests of the universities with
that of their employer. Some ended up feeling that they represented the ministry
in one of the most important negotiations between each university and the
ministry (Jean-Pierre Finance, private communication).
These three policies were somewhat in contradiction and, as any other policy,
had unintended consequences – at least three consequences in this case, as
elaborated below.
2.3.1 Universities Evolved Different Organisational Cultures
Although the universities were generally restructured along disciplinary lines, in
some cases, the restructuring also reflected political (left/right) fractures: some
universities split along party lines and it was left up to individual professors to
decide which university to join. This crystallised long-standing tensions that had
survived over the years.
20 A. Sursock
Even if the restructuring along disciplinary lines was friendlier, it resulted
over time in diverging organisational cultures amongst neighbours. As an example
of this, the organisation of research is vastly different in the universities focused on
the humanities and social sciences (where research is generally an individual
pursuit) to the way it is organised in scientific universities (generally characterised
by teamwork, and requiring more institutional investment: funding, equipment,
health and safety measures, etc.). As a result, the scientific universities tend to be
more hierarchical and disciplined. Student participative culture is also different and
the terms of engagement are generally more political and turbulent in the former
group of universities than in the latter. As will be noted, these contrasting cultural
differences turned into challenges to be overcome when cooperation became a goal
at the turn of the twenty-first century.
2.3.2 National vs. International Prestige Strategies
The policy of boosting the universities’ research capacity through a rapprochement
with the research organisations had a downside because two categories of labora-
tories were created in the process: the UMR that were mentioned above and the
laboratoires d’accueil, which received funding from their university rather than
from the CNRS and similar bodies.
The UMR were considered to be the top laboratories in France, and as a result,
researchers identified more strongly with their laboratories (if it was a UMR) than
with their universities. Researchers valued the UMR label, using it for their individual
promotion at national level, but this strategy undermined their university’s interna-
tional visibility because the researchers signed off their publications using other
affiliations (the laboratory, the funding research organisation, etc.) than the name of
their university.
When the Shanghai Ranking appeared in 2005, it had the effect of a bombshell:
only three French universities were in the Top 100 and the “grandes e´coles” or the
research organisations did not feature in the Top 100. In an effort to understand
the roots of the problem, a scientific and medical university (Universite´ Lyon 1)
undertook an inventory of the ways in which its researchers listed their affiliations
in academic publications and came up with the staggering number of over
50 different ways! The compounded individualistic strategies aimed at gaining
national prestige, resulted in the loss of the researchers’ university affiliation and
a weakening of the aggregate international impact of French university research,
which became hardly visible in the newly created international rankings.
2.3.3 Institutional Strategic Capacity
Furthermore, the multiplicity of research structures resulted in institutional inertia
on the part of the universities, due to a lack of institutional self-confidence and
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pervasive individualism. In other words, the structures did not help individual
academics and these academics, in turn, did not support the structures. In addition,
the continued central steering from the ministry did not contribute to building
institutional strength and effective leadership.
Over time, however, the institutional contract and other measures served to build
up the strategic capacity of French universities. A new generation of presidents
emerged who became attuned to stronger and more effective leadership. A number
of these presidents was no longer willing to accept a situation characterised by
under-funding, limited institutional autonomy and lack of student orientation and
advisory support, which, in the 1980s and 1990s, led to overcrowding and a high
failure rate in the first cycle. The university presidents complained that they were
trapped between two types of more powerful organisations: the grandes e´coles
on the one hand, which were properly funded, had more autonomy and could
select their students; and, research organisations, on the other, which had their
own national research strategies into which the universities were expected to fit
rather than they themselves shape. The universities felt, for good reason, that they
were the handmaidens of the sector, financially strapped and politically squeezed
between the national research organisations and the “grandes e´coles”. Both types of
institutions were considered as the elite part of the sector and, as such, had the ear of
the policy makers in Paris. It did not help matters that the top politicians and civil
servants had been generally educated in the “grandes e´coles” rather than in the
universities and had little exposure to research-based teaching.
2.4 The First Steps Toward Ever-Closer Alliances
Around the year 2002, the universities in Grenoble became the trailblazer in France
when they established “Grenoble Universite´s”. This was an umbrella organisation
to organise and promote cooperation across the universities in Grenoble. Grenoble
Universite´s announced that it would drop the plural to indicate a much closer
cooperation. A number of French universities followed this model. They set up
their own umbrella organisations with some starting to discuss possible mergers in
order to increase their critical mass and address their chronic under-funding.
An article – whimsically entitled Napole´on renverse´ (Napoleon upside down) by
Aust and Crespy (2009) – describes how this consolidation movement started as a
grass-roots initiative, i.e., at the initiative of some university presidents rather than
coming from the ministry.
The ministry supported this movement. The regional and national governments
took several initiatives to encourage such partnerships. In 2003, the ministry
proposed a structure for such cooperation that found few takers. A year later,
at the time of the implementation of the Bologna reforms, the then director
general of higher education, Jean-Marc Monteil (2004), wrote to the universities
emphasising that their future contracts should integrate a strong element of local
partnerships (universities, schools, teachers’ training colleges, university
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hospitals, etc.) and that it was “vital to ensure the coherence of the local
educational offer in order to contribute to regional development, within an
international perspective” (author’s translation).
2.5 Devolution to Regional Authorities
and the Emergence of the “PRES”
Shortly afterward, an initiative, accompanied by financial incentives, to boost
regional partnerships was launched: this was the Poˆles de recherche et
d’enseignement supe´rieur (PRES), which joined a set of similar regional initiatives
such as the Re´seaux the´matiques de recherche avance´e (RTRA) and the Centres the´
matiques de recherche et de soins (CTRS). These initiatives were part of a general
effort to decentralise and devolve power to regional and local actors (Laperche and
Uzunidis 2011) – a process that had started already in the 1980s with the
“Universite´ 2000” plan.
As in other parts of the world, Silicon Valley was the model that central and
regional actors wanted to emulate. This was a far cry from the traditional French
approach to industrial development that had been centrally driven, with the state
defining the overall approach (say, the development of nuclear power) and deciding
the local applications (in this case, the location of the nuclear plants). Such
centralised planning was guided by the notion that, to the extent that it is possible,
there would be a harmonious development across the country. The code words
for this equalising treatment are l’ame´nagement du territoire (or regional
development).
The new funding instruments were conceived in a selective and competitive
way. Thus, the PRES funding was supposed to be concentrated on ten sites but, by
2012, there were 26 PRES.
According to Aust and Crespy (2009), the university presidents who were most
successful at promoting a PRES had a similar professional profile: for the most part,
they were scientists who led scientific universities and whose professional trajec-
tory included an advisory or expert role to the ministry in Paris, their regional
authorities and the European institutions. In the process of driving their change
agenda, these promoters adopted a top-down approach and excluded from the initial
discussions important sections of the university community and the decision-
making bodies, including the staff and student unions and the faculty deans (Aust
and Crespy 2009). This would come back to haunt them a few years later.
The main objectives of the PRES have been to increase critical mass and
improve international visibility. Thus, typical activities include the coordination
of doctoral education (via common doctoral schools), shared policies for the
acquisition, use and maintenance of scientific equipment and facilities; common
internationalisation strategy (promotion, exchanges, agreements, etc.); joint initia-
tives for knowledge transfer and joint signatures on scientific publications.
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The PRES were successful to the extent that they encouraged the university
leadership to be more strategic and to work better with their regional authorities, the
neighbouring grandes e´coles and the local branches of the research organisations.
These are notable achievements even if it has taken time for partners to learn to
work together and if it was challenging to create cohesion when status, salaries and
identities differed across a wide variety of partners. In addition, some PRES have
gone as far as undergoing mergers (Aix-Marseilles, Lorraine).
It remains to be seen, however, if the PRES will bring added value or if they turn
into a new layer of bureaucracy that would have no positive impact on academic
strategies.
2.6 Between Excellence and Regionalism
In addition to the PRES and the other funding instruments, several reforms
were introduced during the Chirac (1995–2007) and the Sarkozy (2007–2012)
presidencies. These included a new law on public finance (LOLF); a “pacte de la
recherche” that saw the creation of a research funding agency (Agence nationale
de la recherche, ANR) and a new evaluation agency (Agence d’e´valuation de
la recherche et de l’enseignement supe´rieur, AERES); a restructuring of the
national research organisations, such as the CNRS; and a new law on university
autonomy (LRU).
2.6.1 A French Excellence Initiative
In addition to these measures, competitive funding was strengthened through the
plan campus and a programme called “investissements d’avenir”. The first was
meant to fund ten campuses of excellence. The selection was based on four criteria:
the academic project, the condition of the physical plan, the development of campus
life and the anchoring in a region. The second programme included a variety of
instruments such as: Equipex to fund intermediate size laboratory equipment,
Labex to fund innovative scientific teams, and IDEX to support the emergence of
a small and select number of alliances and mergers. These instruments were
conceived as the French version of the German Excellence Initiative; in other
words, this policy – particularly the IDEX – concentrated resources on a few
“world-class” universities, perceived as the key drivers of economic growth in a
knowledge-based economy.
It is important to note the quick succession and pileup of initiatives – some of
which were pulling in different directions. Eric Froment, who played a role in the
Lyon PRES and is a keen observer of French higher education and research
development, noted (private communication) that the PRES emphasised partner-
ships and cooperation but that the LRU introduced an individual logic: indeed,
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the universities had to apply and be given approval in order to be allowed to
implement the newly enlarged scope of autonomy. In a number of PRES, some
universities felt they were ready for the LRU whilst others amongst their partner
institutions in the PRES were not ready or were even politically against what they
perceived as a neoliberal policy. These different approaches weakened these PRES,
at least in the short term. When the IDEX were next introduced, they injected once
more a culture of partnerships but with a new twist: a stress on excellence and a
competitive and elitist bent, which was not as strong a feature in the initial culture
of the PRES.
In addition, some of the funding instruments were in contradiction with the
historic way that research had been funded. National funding policy had not always
been linked to evaluations and wavered between excellence and egalitarianism
(depending on the political orientation of the government). Research funds were
sometimes allocated to universities that did not have the appropriate research
capacity even if a nearby institution had more research capacity. In such cases,
research would be carried out by a UMR that would include CNRS (or equivalent)
researchers and university researchers, thus providing a weaker university team the
opportunity to conduct higher quality research. This was done in an attempt to level
off regional differences. The planning arm of the state tried (theoretically) to
ensure that the ame´nagement du territoire was as fair as possible. Although this
approach ended in the 1990s, regional devolution meant that the criteria for funding
research continued to include some consideration of the need to build regional
research capacity.
Given this history, the IDEX and associated competitive funding instruments
created tensions at multiple levels:
• Tensions within the university community at large: a total of eight mega-
alliances of universities were funded through the IDEX. This extra funding
was concentrated in Paris and four other regions, leading to resentment and
questions of fairness and sustainability, such as: Will this policy result in turning
big stretches of France into an “academic desert”? What would be the effect of
such a policy in the long haul? Is it sustainable to concentrate resources to this
extent? Are these mega-universities sustainable and will they succeed?
• Tensions between the IDEX-funded alliances and the neighbouring universities
that were not part of the alliances, e.g., between the universities located in the
centre of Paris and those in the immediate suburbs; in Alsace, between the
Universite´ de Strasbourg and the nearby Universite´ de Mulhouse.
• Tensions across the different alliances within Paris, for instance, over which
alliance would seize the coveted Sorbonne brand name (since all the Parisian
universities are the daughters of the August alma mater).
• Tensions within each university that received IDEX or Labex funding: by pitting
the staff unions against the university leadership, whom they criticised for the lack
of collegial decision making in constituting the alliances, and in playing off one
laboratory against another as a result of the competitive Labex funding model.
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Thus, these tensions and the pace of recent change have been reverberating
across all levels, within each university and up to the level of the sector at large,
including, therefore the French conference of university presidents (CPU), which
has been struggling, at times, to find consensus amongst its members. Indeed,
diverging views have found their ways into the printed press, with one group or
another of university presidents signing a letter putting forward minority views on
crucial issues for the sector. For instance, 11 presidents signed an open letter
denouncing the LRU, the recent law on autonomy (AEF 2013). Alternatively, the
statements emanating from the CPU have been sometimes qualified as de l’eau
tie`de (lukewarm water), an expression referring to their lack of punch as they strive
to reach consensus. Needless to say, these challenges were understandable and
many other associations of universities across the world have had to find a way to
deal with increased competition within their midst.
2.6.2 The Increased Role of Regional Governments
The shift towards concentrating resources and supporting a few pockets of
excellence should also be seen in the context of a shift of power from the central
to the regional governments in France. The gradual devolution of power toward
regional governments meant that these became increasingly sensitive to the need to
have a regional knowledge strategy. Those regional governments with a good tax
base and strong universities (that produced the regional political elite) were well
placed to provide funding instruments to their knowledge institutions, thus also
contributing to diversification and rivalry from a national perspective.
Increasingly, the regional governments learnt how to support their universities
to the point that some wanted to go so far as defining the universities’ strategy.
This prompted the then minister for higher education and research (Laurent
Wauquiez) and the then director for higher education (Patrick Hetzel) to warn the
university presidents during their 2012 annual colloquium about the danger of
“glisser d’une tutelle a l’autre”, i.e. the risk of losing the hard-earned autonomy
that had been bestowed by the central government in exchange for less autonomy
vis-a-vis the regional governments.
The tension between the central and regional governments was exacerbated during
the Sarkozy era because the vast majority of regional governments were in the hands
of the Socialist Party. This also had consequences for higher education, particularly in
the Paris region, where some projects became hostage to fortune. For example, the
new Condorcet campus in Paris and nearby Aubervilliers, specialised in the social
sciences, has been in the planning stage since 2007. It brings together four universi-
ties, several research organisations, several institutes, about 200,000 m2 of new
buildings, the Paris City Hall, the regional authorities and the ministry. So far,
no building has risen from the ground. Tensions between the socialist regional
government and the Sarkozy government over how to co-finance the Condorcet
development seemed to have slowed down the start of the project. The Sarkozy
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government favoured Public Private Partnerships (PPP) for the plan campus projects,
including this one, whilst the regional government favoured a public offer and
funding. The vice president of the regional authority, Isabelle This Saint-Jean, is
quoted as saying:
The former government wanted to impose PPP and considered the regional
authority as a cash cow; its communication about the project was inaccurate whilst
nothing had ever been built. This arm wrestling has considerably slowed down the
project (Stromboni 2013b).
The Condorcet campus is also emblematic of the confusion that is being created
by multiple, interlocking initiatives: here is one new organisation – Condorcet –
that is composed of ten different institutions, some of which are involved in
different Parisian PRES. Thus, Universite´ Paris 1 is part of a PRES called
He´Sam; universities Paris 3 and 13 are part of the Paris Cite´ PRES; and Universite´
Paris 8 is part of the Paris Lumie`re PRES. It is difficult to see how these overlapping
affiliations will be managed and guided down a coherent path.
2.6.3 The Recent Mergers
It is a relief then to travel from Paris south to Marseille or northeast to Strasbourg
and the Lorraine. There, universities have managed to merge and to consolidate.
As was mentioned earlier, universities across France were restructured in the 1970s.
The first to merge were the three universities in Strasbourg (2009) followed by
the three universities in Aix-en-Provence and Marseille (2012) and the three
universities in Nancy with the University of Metz in Lorraine (2012). Other mergers
have been announced in Bordeaux, Montpellier, and Toulouse, to name a few;
whether these will be successful and all-inclusive remains to be seen.
If the PRES include universities and non-universities (grandes e´coles, etc.), the
mergers are only taking place amongst universities. The Universite´ de Lorraine
includes the schools of engineering that were the constituent parts of the Institut
national polytechnique although this institute has the same legal status as univer-
sities. This consolidation movement has been accelerated by the IDEX funding.
Once the decision to fund eight big projects was taken, it accelerated mirroring
strategies elsewhere even if questions were being asked about the “mastodontes”
(mammoths) that such a dynamic was creating. Was big really that beautiful?
Wasn’t the California Institute of Technology tiny and successful? Is going big
the only strategy open to an underfunded sector and its only chance to exist on the
world stage? The answer is tentatively positive if, for instance, the Shanghai
ranking is taken as a measure of success since its indicators are calculated in
absolute rather than relative numbers. In this case, big is indeed better!
(Rauhvargers 2011).
Regardless of these lingering questions, many had changed their minds and
come to realise that French universities needed to be reformed in order to increase
the span of their interdisciplinarity, rationalise the educational offer and built on
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specific research strengths. The mergers and alliances were a way of triggering such
a strategic change process. It remains to be seen if this was the most effective and
least painful way of achieving such objectives. At the same time, some universities
are resisting the movement. Thus, in Bordeaux and Montpellier, the humanities
universities have dissociated themselves from their local merger projects. In other
parts of France, it is the engineering schools that were concerned in preserving their
identity and independence. It will be interesting to see if these institutions will
encounter difficulties in creating a niche for themselves in the future.
Other French universities decided to link closely some of their units (e.g., in
Cre´teil and Marne-la-Valle´e, and Dijon and Franche-Comte´). These experiences
offer the opportunity to practise a rapprochement on a small scale and prepare
a more ambitious institution-wide merger, with its attendant administrative
challenges. Most importantly, it often gives a role to the rank-and-file who also
see immediate academic benefits ([. . .] or not) in increasing their critical mass.
Still other universities (such as those in Lille, Lyon, Rennes, etc.) decided to
strengthen cooperation without going through the obstacle course that mergers
represent. Each of their individual stories – and their twists and turns – shows the
extent of the difficulties entailed. For instance, the three universities in Lille (Lille
1, 2 and 3) were not always on the same page: at some point, Lille 2 decided against
a closer alliance and stayed on the sidelines whilst Lille 1 and 3 made progress in
discussing cooperation; recently Lille 2 changed its position and joined the closer
alliance again but on condition that merging is no longer an option. Therefore, in
an attempt to lower the tensions, the future shape of the Lille project is now
shrouded in ambiguity and its contours are no longer defined.
A very candid interview with Fabienne Blaise, the new president of Universite´
Lille 3, is very revealing in this respect (Stromboni 2013a, b). She identifies
the following three sets of factors that have contributed to the meanderings and
the delays:
• The focus of the early discussions in Lille was about the institutional aspects of
the project; these were the most complex (Although she does not say this,
presumably, it would have been more useful to discuss the academic benefits
of the merger instead of the administrative ones; this would have served to
stimulate and motivate the academic community).
• Although working groups had been organised, the lack of university-wide
discussion was evident. This project was being discussed within the top leader-
ship teams and involved presidents and vice-presidents. This led to conspiracy
theories and resulted in the failure of two university presidents to get re-elected.
The third president was re-elected but “understood that he needs to work in a
different way”, i.e., consult more effectively. (It is interesting to note that the
third president led the scientific university and that he is the only one who
survived his critics.).
• The social science and humanities university asked for reassurance that its needs
would not be overshadowed by those of the science university.
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2.6.4 The University Leadership vs. The Rank-and-File
All these experiences helped to indicate to the university leadership that the time for
single solutions to complex problems was over. A very strong consensus emerged
amongst them around a key word: “souplesse” (flexibility). In other words, they
insisted that the legal framework should remain sufficiently open to allow a range
of institutional solutions.
The academic rank-and-file, however, was in a different place. Some of the staff
unions have been resisting the double shift: the shifting power from the central state
to the regional authorities and, more worryingly for them, to the presidential teams
in the universities. Naturally, they could only view as a threat any strategy that
made power more distributed and therefore more proximate. Their strengths
derived from being able to organise themselves as a bloc against central national
policies. Introducing greater differentiation, regional devolution and institutional
autonomy could only dilute their collective punch.
In addition, excellence-driven policies have a cost, including human ones as
noted by Patricia Pol:
Permanent stress, pressures and frustrations generated by competition are some of the
factors contributing to unhappiness and imbalance. The time spent negotiating risky
agreements, the cost of coordinating these new cooperative structures increase the work-
loads of academics at the risk of driving their attention away from their core mission of
research and teaching (Pol 2012).
It is in this context that the Hollande government decided to conduct a thorough
review of the most recent reforms with the stated aim of correcting the negative
effects of past initiatives via a new law. At time of writing (Feltesse 2013), Vincent
Feltesse, the parliament rapporteur for the new law, was conducting preliminary
hearings in preparation for the parliamentary debate. His blog sought to reassure its
readers by stating that the law will give flexibility to a range of groupings – mergers,
alliances (communaute´s) and associations (rattachements). These groupings could
straddle administrative boundaries and the ministry would be required to sign a
contract with each grouping.
Rumour had it, however, that the contracts would be signed by the grouping of
all institutions within each academy (with the exception of Paris). These academies
are administrative units led by a recteur d’acade´mie, who represents the state on all
matters pertaining to education and higher education.
It is easy to see why the ministry would prefer to operate in this standardised
bureaucratic way, given the increased complexity caused by the interlocking of
structures, as shown for instance in the Condorcet example discussed earlier.
When the idea that the ministry would deal with only a single grouping was
broached with Fabienne Blaise in Lille, she responded in a sharp tone that there
were four groupings rather than one in the Lille “acade´mie” and that the ministry
would have to make do with the situation: “They can’t tell us, just like this, with a
snap of their fingers: ‘we want to talk to one grouping’. This irritates me. It won’t
push us to cooperate and it won’t reduce complexity. Most importantly, I would not
want this to act as a break on the grouping dynamic.” (Stromboni 2013a, b).
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2.7 Concluding Remarks
It is clear that the sector has undergone a number of major policy changes and
challenges. Their accumulation has been difficult to manage and the situation is far
from being stabilised. The gains that have been made over the years could be lost as
the sector is still prone to wide policy swings with respect to the links between the
universities, the research organisations, the grandes e´coles and both the national
and regional authorities.
Stronger institutional leadership is emerging but it remains to be seen if it will be
able to motivate staff and students and provide incentives for change in an
unfavourable economic context. In addition, leadership is a necessary but not
sufficient condition. University leadership is exercised in an arena that includes
multiple actors – staff and student and their unions, “grandes e´coles”, research
organisations, national and regional authorities – and these will not be necessarily
pushing in the same direction. The historical tendency toward centralisation and
fragmentation might once again prevail unless good university leadership is com-
bined with the capacity of the central state to change and adapt and if the regional
authorities resist the siren call of increased power.
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